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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate whether dynamic incentive schemes lead to a ratchet effect 
in a social dilemma. We test whether subjects strategically restrict their contribution levels at the 
beginning of a cumulative public goods game in order to avoid high obligations in the future and 
how this affects efficiency. The incentive schemes prescribe that individual contributions have to 
be at least as high as, or strictly higher than, contributions in the previous period. We observe a 
substantial and statistically significant ratchet effect. Participants reduce their public good 
contribution levels at the beginning of the game, anticipating that higher contributions imply higher 
minimum contribution levels in the future, which increases the risk of being exploited by free-
riders. While the dynamic incentive schemes lead to increasing contribution levels over the course 
of the game, this increase is not strong enough to compensate the efficiency losses at the beginning. 
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1 Introduction 
Minimum contribution levels (MCLs) are a widely used mechanism to overcome free-riding 
incentives in social dilemma situations, where actions by rational and self-interested individuals do 
not align with common group interests. For example, governments impose minimum levels 
regarding the energy efficiency in household appliances and the sorting of waste or levy taxes as a 
minimum monetary contribution to environmental public goods.1 A variety of economic 
experiments (e.g. Andreoni 1993; Eckel et al. 2005; Gronberg et al. 2012) shows that MCLs 
typically do not completely crowd out voluntary contributions, thus effectively increasing public 
good provision levels. 
A common feature of the aforementioned studies is that the implemented minimum contributions 
are static and agents’ current decisions do not have dynamic implications for their future MCLs. In 
many cooperation problems, though, minimum contributions are subject to dynamic incentive 
schemes where current decisions act as a benchmark for future contributions. The Paris Agreement 
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) is a prominent 
example. After years of unfruitful negotiations to reach a globally binding “top-down” climate 
agreement, in 2015 Parties of the UNFCCC agreed to set out a “bottom-up” global action plan with 
the objective to avoid dangerous climate change and limit global warming to well below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels (Green et al. 2014). From a current perspective, however, countries’ nationally 
determined contributions are insufficient to reach the agreed long-term climate objective (Rogelj 
et al. 2016). To ensure that this gap will be closed and to achieve the two-degree target, the 
agreement contains a dynamic component in form of an incremental contribution scheme that 
prescribes that nationally determined contributions have to increase over time. The agreement 
requires a global stocktake of nationally determined contributions every five years combined with 
a gradual ratcheting-up of ambitions. When countries set their climate targets at the start of each 
five-year period, they already know that they will have to increase their ambitions in the next 
period. High hopes are placed on this process of persistently increasing mitigation efforts, called 
“ratcheting”, that should help to increase contributions to the global public good of climate change 
                                                        
1 The interaction between private and public climate change mitigation efforts might serve as an important example. 
Voluntary contributions to climate protection (e.g. Löschel et al. 2013; Diederich and Goeschl 2014) are made given 
public regulations, like carbon prices, which could be interpreted as minimum climate change mitigation effort. 
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mitigation (e.g. Young 2016; Holz et al. 2018).2 However, ratcheting might backfire since agents 
could anticipate that their current contributions to the public good increase their minimum 
contribution level in the future. The effect of such a dynamic incentive scheme that enacts public 
good contribution levels to increase over time, thus strikes us as an important but understudied 
question in public economics, and in environmental economics in particular. 
It is exactly this effect of dynamic incentive schemes in a social dilemma situation that we address 
in this paper. This relates our paper to the economic literature on dynamic incentive schemes in 
general and the effect of incremental contribution schemes in cooperation problems in particular. 
In general, the ratchet principle (or simply “ratcheting”) implies the use of current performance to 
determine future economic targets.3 This principle, which is an almost universal feature of 
economic planning, creates a dynamic incentive problem (e.g. Weitzman 1980), as higher rewards 
from better current performance must be weighed against the future assignment of more ambitious 
targets. Rational agents potentially restrict current efforts in order to avoid increased obligations in 
the future. So far, there is a substantial experimental literature on the effect of ratcheting in 
principal-agent problems in labor market contexts (e.g. Chaudhuri 1998; Charness et al. 2011). A 
key finding, the so called ratchet effect, refers to a situation where agents compensated based on 
productivity strategically “masquerading” as low-output workers relative to their true capacity, as 
the agents rationally anticipate that current high levels of output will be met with increased future 
requirements by the principal, who does not have complete information about agents’ skills (e.g. 
Charness et al. 2011; Cardella and Depew 2018). In the context of piece-rate compensation, 
Charness et al. (2011), for instance, find strong evidence for a ratchet effect. In an environment 
without any competition among workers, they observe that participants systematically restrict their 
current output levels in order to avoid reduced rewards in the future. Amano and Ohashi (2018) 
use field data from the Japanese television market in order to investigate the effect of regulation 
that holds that televisions sold during a future target year must be at least as energy efficient as the 
most efficient product sold in the base year. The result is that firms hold back on the energy 
                                                        
2 Ratcheting is an important element of the Paris Agreement and the agreed “pledge-and-review” process: “As 
nationally determined contributions to the global response to climate change, all Parties are to undertake and 
communicate efforts [...] the efforts of all Parties will present progression over time [...]” and “Each Party's successive 
nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party's then current nationally determined 
contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, […]” (UNFCCC 2015, Article 3 and 4.3). 
3 The term “ratchet principle” goes back to Berliner’s treatment on managerial behavior in a centralized planning 
system. See Berliner (1957), pp. 78-80. 
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efficiency of their products in order to be able to continue selling less efficient products for the 
foreseeable future.4 
We investigate whether a ratchet principle, that prescribes that cooperation has to increase over 
time, creates an incentive problem in a repeated social dilemma by inducing incentives to 
strategically restrict cooperation at the beginning in order to avoid high obligations in the future. 
We implement dynamic MCLs into a cumulative public goods game (e.g. Duffy et al. 2007) where 
agents have the option to repeatedly contribute to a public good in discrete time with cumulating 
benefits. The MCLs we analyze prescribe that agents have to contribute as much (weak ratcheting) 
or even strictly more (strong ratcheting) than what they have contributed in the period before. Both 
ratcheting treatments are compared to a voluntary contribution mechanism without a dynamic 
contribution scheme. 
This relates our paper to the literature on incremental contribution schemes in social dilemmas. 
Schelling (1960) suggests small, sequential, and contingent commitments in order to limit the 
extent to which agents expose themselves to the risk of being free ridden, establish trust, and, 
finally, foster cooperation. Support for Schelling’s hypothesis comes from the literature on static 
versus dynamic cooperation problems (e.g. Marx and Matthews 2000; Duffy et al. 2007) as well 
as cooperation problems in discrete and continuous time (e.g. Friedman and Oprea 2012; Oprea et 
al. 2014). Having multiple contribution decisions and the opportunity to (rapidly) adjust 
contribution levels depending on others’ contributions facilitates cooperation as individuals only 
need to sacrifice small contributions to test how cooperative others are. 
To the best of our knowledge, Dorsey (1992) is the first paper that investigates the effect of a 
ratchet principle that prescribes that participants cannot adjust their commitments to contribute to 
a public good downwards. In each period of his experiment participants have the opportunity to 
pledge their public good contribution levels and continuously update their pledges in real-time. The 
actual contribution level is given by the pledge at the end of each period. He finds that public good 
contribution levels are higher when participants can only increase their pledges compared to when 
pledges can be in- or decreased. Also Kurzban et al. (2001) modify how pledges in a public goods 
game in continuous time can be constantly revised, i.e., whether pledges can be adjusted up- and 
downwards, or only upwards. In addition, they vary whether participants have access to full 
information about others’ pledges, or only receive information about the lowest or highest pledge 
                                                        
4 Macartney (2016) detects ratcheting also in the context of education accountability schemes in a study using field 
data. 
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per group. In line with Dorsey (1992), they find that a ratchet principle, that prescribes that 
participants who raised their pledges to a certain level are unable to reverse their decision, 
facilitates cooperation, especially when participants are only informed about the smallest pledge 
per group during the course of a period.5 Ye et al. (2020) use a discrete coordination game to test 
whether gradually increasing thresholds can facilitate coordination within groups. If all participants 
contribute the required threshold, they do not only receive their contribution back but also gain an 
extra return; if not, participants finish the period with their remaining endowment. As treatment 
variable, they vary the level of thresholds across periods. They find that groups who start at low 
but gradually increasing thresholds are especially successful. One possible explanation could be 
that high thresholds at the beginning of the game increase the extent to which participants expose 
themselves to the risk of coordination failure, since participants have to sacrifice high contributions 
in order to test how others response. 
Within the literature on ratcheting in social dilemmas, our experiment differs from those previous 
studies, in particularly Dorsey (1992), Kurzban et al. (2001), and Ye et al. (2020). In addition to 
our cooperation game, which differs from Ye et al. (2020), our experiment includes dynamic 
contribution schemes over discrete periods with cumulating benefits. Dorsey (1992) as well as 
Kurzban et al. (2001) rely on public goods games in continuous time where commitments can be 
constantly revised in each period of the game and focus at participants’ final contributions at the 
end of each period. Furthermore, in both studies, decisions in one period do not depend on the 
previous period. All this precludes them from investigating whether a ratchet principle, that 
prescribes that contributions have to increase over time, induces a ratchet effect in that sense that 
participants strategically restrict cooperation at the beginning in order to avoid increased 
obligations in the future. In order to test for a ratchet effect in a social dilemma, our public goods 
game is played in discrete time with cumulating benefits and contributions that depend on the 
period before. In addition, we use different ratchet principles that prescribe that contributions 
cannot be adjusted downwards or have to increase to investigate how the stringency of the 
                                                        
5 Similar results are obtained in other cooperation problems played in continuous time, such as threshold public goods 
games (Diev and Hichri 2008) and public goods games with different aggregation technologies (Güth et al. 2002). 
Fellner et al. (2003) made an early attempt to relate the ratchet effect to the private provision of public goods in discrete 
time. In their experiment, the cost of the public good provision depend on previous contribution levels in that sense 
that it is cheaper to provide the public good below than above the previous level. They observe that public good 
provision with such a dynamic production technology is lower than compared to a standard linear production 
technology. 
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mechanism affects participants’ incentives to be reluctant to contribute at the beginning of the 
game.  
We complement the existing literature by testing if dynamic MCLs lead to such a ratchet effect in 
a cumulated public goods game in discrete time and how this affects efficiency. While a continuous 
public goods game does adequately reflect many types of social dilemmas, such as fundraising 
activities where donations are made asynchronously in continuous time, we focus on more 
institutionalized social dilemma situations such as international climate policy where discrete 
political decisions that cannot be constantly revised are prevalent. The global stocktake within the 
UNFCCC, for instance, stipulates a simultaneous and periodical review of the collective climate 
change mitigation efforts every five years to assess the collective progress towards achieving the 
purpose of the Paris Agreement.  
In the theory part of the paper, we show that the cumulated public good provision level is not 
expected to be affected by ratcheting (neither by weak nor strong ratcheting). Transferred to the 
corresponding contribution levels per period, this implies that the equilibrium cumulated 
contribution level is divided equally across all periods and is therefore equal to the Nash 
equilibrium in our baseline treatment, as well as in our weak ratcheting treatment. In strong 
ratcheting, however, the optimal cumulated provision level is predicted to be divided differently 
over the course of the game. While contributions in strong ratcheting are predicted to be below the 
Nash equilibrium at the beginning of the game, they have to increase – by design – from period-
to-period and exceed the contribution in the Nash equilibrium at the end of the game. Consequently, 
the aggregated contribution level is not reached at lowest cost in strong ratcheting. 
Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we find a distinct ratchet effect. Ratcheting clearly affects 
participants’ cumulated public good provision levels. Both weak and strong ratcheting substantially 
reduce public good contributions at the beginning of the game compared to the baseline. While 
contributions increase over the course of the game in both ratcheting treatments, this increase is 
not strong enough to compensate for the initial loss in efficiency. Consequently, weak and strong 
ratcheting reduce cumulated public good provision levels and have a negative effect on efficiency. 
Thus, our results challenge the idea that ratcheting is a promising mechanism in order to solve or 
at least mitigate the social dilemma situation which global climate policy is confronted with. While 
already from a theoretical perspective one should be skeptical whether ratcheting increases 
contributions in a public goods game, our empirical results suggest that ratcheting on average even 
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reduces contributions to the public good. Our results thus complement the existing critical 
evaluation of the Paris Agreement from the economic perspective (e.g. Cooper et al. 2017). 
Furthermore, the analysis at the individual level suggests that participants’ fear of the risk of being 
exploited is especially strong at the beginning of the ratcheting treatments, which helps to explain 
the low contribution levels at the beginning of the game. In weak and strong ratcheting, positive 
public good contribution levels determine a path dependency that cannot simply be adjusted 
downwards in the next decision. Therefore, the risk of being exploited by free-riders is more 
pronounced with ratcheting and, consequently, participants are especially reluctant at the beginning 
of the game and contribute significantly less in the ratcheting treatments than in the baseline. 
Section 2 of this paper presents the experimental design, the theoretical predictions, and the 
procedure, we discuss our results in Section 3, and we provide our conclusion in Section 4. 
2 Experimental design, hypotheses and procedure 
2.1 Game and treatments 
Our experimental design extends the standard linear public goods game in order to provide a careful 
test of a ratchet effect in a social dilemma. A necessary condition for detecting a ratchet effect is 
that the Nash equilibrium is interior. In addition, based on dynamic voluntary contribution games 
(e.g. Duffy et al. 2007), subjects’ payoffs depend on the cumulated benefits from the public goods 
game. These features of our experiment present a break with the majority of public goods games 
conducted in the past (e.g. Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; Chaudhuri 2010). 
We define groups of 𝑛 identical members, 𝑖 ∈ {1, … , 𝑛}. In all treatments, the game consists of 𝑇 
periods. In every period 𝑡 ∈ {1, … , 𝑇}, participants receive a monetary endowment of 𝑤 and decide 
which amount of this endowment is contributed to the public good, 𝑔௜,௧, while the rest, 𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧, 
goes to the private account. At the end of the game, subject 𝑖 receives the benefits from her 
cumulate contributions to her private account (𝛼 ∑ (𝑤்௧ୀଵ − 𝑔௜,௧) − 𝛽 ∑ ൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧൯
ଶ்
௧ୀଵ ) as well as 
the cumulated benefits from the public good (𝛾 ∑ 𝐺௧்௧ୀଵ ) which depends on the cumulated 
contributions made by all group members over all periods of the game. Formally, subject 𝑖’s payoff 
at the end of period 𝑇 is given by: 
Π௜ = ∑ 𝜋௜,௧்௧ୀଵ = 𝛼 ∑ (𝑤்௧ୀଵ − 𝑔௜,௧) − 𝛽 ∑ ൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧൯
ଶ்
௧ୀଵ + 𝛾 ∑ 𝐺௧்௧ୀଵ − ∑ 𝑇𝑎𝑥்௧ୀଵ   
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where 𝜋௜,௧ = 𝛼൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧൯ − 𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧൯
ଶ
+ 𝛾𝐺௧ − 𝑇𝑎𝑥 is 𝑖’s payoff in period 𝑡, 𝐺௧ = ∑ 𝑔௜,௧௡௜ୀଵ  is 
the group contribution in period 𝑡, and 𝛼 > 𝛾 > 0, 𝛽 > 0, 𝑇𝑎𝑥 > 0 are constants. The tax is 
introduced in order to calibrate payoffs. Since the tax is lump sum, it has no effect on the incentives 
to contribute. The payoff function is characterized by linearity in the benefits of the public good, 
and by convexity in the costs of the public good (e.g. Keser 1996; Dannenberg et al. 2014).  
Besides our baseline treatment (base), we implement two experimental treatments with different 
dynamic incentive schemes. In base, participants decide in each period 𝑡 anonymously, and 
simultaneously about individual contributions to the public good, i.e., 0 ≤ 𝑔௜,௧ ≤ 𝑤. In our weak 
ratcheting treatment (weakR), participants decide exactly as in base, but each contribution has to 
be at least as high as the contribution in the previous period, i.e., 𝑔௜,௧ିଵ ≤ 𝑔௜,௧ ≤ 𝑤. In the first 
period, this minimum contribution is equal to zero. In the strong ratcheting treatment (strongR), 
each contribution has to be strictly higher than in the previous period, i.e., 𝑔௜,௧ିଵ < 𝑔௜,௧ ≤ 𝑤. As in 
weakR, the minimum contribution is equal to zero in the first period. 
2.2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 
We derive theoretical predictions based on the standard model, which assumes that agents are 
rational and purely selfish. The corresponding contribution paths are illustrated in Figure 1. The 
unique Nash equilibrium in dominant strategies is given by subjects’ payoff maximizing public 
good contribution levels in period 𝑡 of 𝑔௜,௧∗ = 𝑤 +
ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
. Consequently, over all periods the payoff 
maximizing contribution level of subject 𝑖 cumulates to 𝐺௜∗ = ∑ 𝑔௜,௧∗ = 𝑇𝑔௜,௧∗்௧ୀଵ .6 The welfare 
maximizing public good contributions per subject over all periods sum up to 𝐺௜° = ∑ 𝑔௜,௧ °்௧ୀଵ  with 
individual contribution in period 𝑡 in the social optimum given by 𝑔௜,௧° = 𝑤 +
௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
. For 𝑛 > 1, 
there is a social dilemma where the individually rational contribution is below the collectively 
rational contribution. Each subject’s payoff is maximized by the cumulated contribution level equal 
to 𝐺௜∗ = 𝑇(𝑤 +
ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
) in all three treatments. This conjecture is summarized in our first hypothesis 
(H1) that states that cumulated contribution levels per subject over all periods are equal to the Nash 
equilibrium in base, weakR, and strongR. 
H1. 𝐺௜௕௔௦௘ = 𝐺௜௪௘௔௞ோ = 𝐺௜
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ = 𝐺௜∗ 
                                                        
6 See Appendix 1 for a derivation of the contribution level in the Nash equilibrium and in the social optimum. 
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In consequence, the unique Nash equilibrium in cumulated public good contributions per subject 
is below the welfare maximizing contribution level of 𝐺௜° = 𝑇(𝑤 +
௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
) for 𝑛 > 1. 
Transferred to the individual contribution levels per period, this first hypothesis implies that 
subjects in base and weakR divide the optimal cumulative contribution level of 𝐺௜∗ equally across 
all periods. This leads to our second hypothesis (H2) which states that individual contribution levels 
in base and weakR are equal to the Nash equilibrium in any period 𝑡. 
H2. 𝑔௜,௧௪௘௔௞ோ = 𝑔௜,௧௕௔௦௘ = 𝑔௜,௧∗  
In strongR, in contrast, it is by design not possible to contribute 𝑔௜,௧∗ , or any other constant 
contribution level, in all 𝑇 periods of the game. Nevertheless, it is payoff maximizing for subject 𝑖 
to contribute the cumulated contribution level of 𝐺௜∗ in sum over all 𝑇 periods. Consequently, the 
overall equilibrium contribution level is divided differently over the periods of the game. Since 
individual public good contributions have to increase, subjects contribute less than the Nash 
solution at the beginning of the game, 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ < 𝑔௜,௧∗  for 𝑡 < 𝑇[଴.ହ] where 𝑇[଴.ହ] is the median of 
all 𝑇 periods. They contribute the Nash solution in the middle, 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑔௜,௧∗  for 𝑡 = 𝑇[଴.ହ], and 
contribute more than the Nash solution at the end, 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ > 𝑔௜,௧∗  for 𝑡 > 𝑇[଴.ହ].7 This conjecture 
leads to the third hypothesis (H3), which refers to the contribution pattern across all periods. While 
in period 1 contributions in strongR are below those in base and weakR, in period 𝑇 contributions 
in strongR exceed contributions in base and weakR. 
H3. (a) 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ < 𝑔௜,௧∗  if 𝑡 < 𝑇[଴.ହ] 
 (b) 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ = 𝑔௜,௧∗  if 𝑡 = 𝑇[଴.ହ] 
 (c) 𝑔௜,௧
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ > 𝑔௜,௧∗  if 𝑡 > 𝑇[଴.ହ] 
 
To sum up, strong ratcheting will divide the aggregated contribution level 𝐺௜∗ differently from the 
Nash solution over the periods; therefore, the aggregated contribution level is not reached at lowest 
cost. Note also that the socially optimal ratcheting path in strongR, which can be derived 
analogously, deviates from the social optimum without ratcheting (see Figure 1). 
 
                                                        
7 A detailed derivation of our third hypothesis is provided in Appendix 1. 
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Figure 1: Theoretical predictions for contribution levels 
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2.3 Parameterization 
The parameters are chosen to meet the following specifications of the Nash equilibrium, the Pareto 
efficient allocation, and the equilibrium contribution path. Both the Nash equilibrium and social 
optimum are in the interior of subjects’ strategy space and easy to identify and quantify. The 
differences between subjects’ contribution levels in the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum 
are substantial. Finally, choosing the Nash equilibrium is associated with considerable losses in 
efficiency. The parameters are set as follows: group size 𝑛 = 4, periods 𝑇 = 5, endowment per 
period 𝑤 = 100 of the experimental currency (ECU), 𝛼 = 4.4, 𝛽 = 0.02, 𝛾 = 1, and 𝑇𝑎𝑥 = 100. 
The unique Nash equilibrium is where each subject contributes 𝐺௜∗ = 75 over all five periods and 
𝑔௜,௧∗ = 15 per period. The symmetric Pareto efficient outcome is where each subject contributes 
𝐺௜° = 450 over all periods and 𝑔௜,௧ ° = 90 per period. In strongR, the equilibrium contribution path 
starts at 𝑔௜,ଵ = 13 in period 1 and increases to 𝑔௜,ହ = 17 in period 5.8 Consequently, the individual 
payoffs per subject in the social optimum are given by 𝛱௜° = 1,510 and are substantially higher 
than those in the Nash equilibrium 𝛱௜∗ = 947.5. The efficiency gain in the social optimum 
                                                        
8 To simplify the experimental procedure, public good contribution levels are restricted to integer numbers. 
Furthermore, if participants reach the maximum contribution level of 𝑔௜,௧ = 100 in strongR, the minimum contribution 
level in the next period is set to 100. 
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compared to the Nash solution is about 60 percent. There is practically no difference between the 
equilibrium payoff for strongR and the payoff in the Nash solution (for base and weakR).9 
2.4 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at the MaxLab laboratory of the University of Magdeburg, 
Germany. We used the software z-Tree developed by Fischbacher (2007) for programming the 
experiment, and participants were recruited via hroot (Bock et al. 2012). In terms of statistical 
inference, we based our sampling on experimental pilot sessions.10 Based on this pilot, we decided 
to conduct 20 sessions in total in May and June 2019 with 340 participants overall. This results in 
85 independent observations distributed relatively evenly across treatments, i.e. 30 independent 
observation in base, 27 in strongR, and 28 in weakR. This allows us to detect treatment effects 
comparable to those of the experimental pilot at a conventional level of statistical significance (5 
percent) at a very high level of statistical power of more than 99 percent. 
At the beginning of each session, we randomly created groups of four players which remained fixed 
(“partner matching”). Participants received a set of experimental instructions which included 
written descriptions, numerical examples, and control questions. Furthermore, participants were 
able to make use of a payoff table to verify the numerical examples, answer control questions, and 
simulate different contribution decisions.11 During the game, information on group members’ 
individual contributions to the public good, payoffs, and corresponding average values within the 
group were transmitted via screen.  
Important to note is that a session consists of five consecutive but independent games, called 
“phases”, each with five periods of the public goods game. Before the first phase started, 
participants played two non-payoff relevant practice periods. At the end of each session, cumulated 
earnings of one randomly chosen phase were selected to determine participants’ earnings. Sessions 
lasted around an hour and earnings ranged from 3.10 euros to 15.50 euros, with an average of 9.50 
euros. 
                                                        
9 Due to the convexity of the costs in the payoff function the cumulated equilibrium payoff in strongR (947.0) is slightly 
below the cumulated payoff in the Nash solution for base and weakR (947.5).  
10 The first three sessions were run as an experimental pilot in May 2019. All other sessions were executed with exactly 
the same procedure in June 2019. We used the data generated in the pilot experiment for a power analysis (see 
Appendix 2). 
11 We provide an example of instructions and screenshots in Appendix 4 and 5. The payoff table was a matrix which 
indicated the individual payoff in a period given average contributions by the other group members in columns and 
own contributions in rows (each in 5 units steps from 0 to 100).  
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Figure 2: Cooperation rates per group by phase, period, and treatment  
 
Note: Average cooperation rates by phase, period, and treatment. Cooperation rates are given by ൬
௚೔,೟ି௚೔,೟
∗
௚೔,೟
° ି௚೔,೟
∗ ൰ × 100% in 
order to ease interpretation and assure that contributions at the Nash equilibrium and the social optimum correspond 
to 0 and 100 percent, respectively. Confidence intervals are calculated at the 95 percent level. 
3 Results 
3.1 Group level analysis 
At first, we analyze participants’ public good contribution levels at the group level. Average 
contribution levels by phase, period, and treatments are presented in Figure 2 and summarized in 
Table 1. In our base treatment, both the level of average contributions as well as its pattern are 
comparable to other voluntary contribution mechanisms (e.g. Ledyard 1995; Zelmer 2003; 
Chaudhuri 2011).  
On average, the cooperation rate is 39.81 percent.12 Average cooperation rates over all phases 
decrease from 49.42 percent in period 1 to 28.66 percent in period 5. Cooperation rates in our 
ratcheting treatments show a different trend. Our first result shows that cooperation rates in weakR 
and strongR are significantly below those in base at the beginning of each phase. 
                                                        
12 In order to ensure comparability to results of linear public goods games, cooperation rates in our non-linear public 
goods game with interior solutions are calculated such that contributions at the Nash equilibrium are set to 0 percent 
and contributions at the social optimum are set to 100 percent (see note to Figure 2).  
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Table 1: Cooperation rates – Group level analysis 
 Overall  Per phase 
  Phase I Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V 
Panel A. baseline (base) 
All Periods 39.81  
(2.094) 
 46.58 
(1.627) 
43.90 
(1.650) 
38.44 
(1.651) 
35.91 
(1.685) 
34.22 
(1.656) 
First Period 49.42 
(4.302) 
 57.37 
(3.528) 
53.57 
(3.635) 
48.33 
(3.812) 
42.08 
(3.635) 
45.73 
(3.650) 
Last Period 28.66 
(4.518) 
 37.57 
(3.705) 
35.09 
(3.612) 
29.13 
(3.544) 
24.90 
(3.749) 
16.62 
(3.539) 
Panel B. weak ratcheting (weakR) 
All Periods 22.34 
(1.602) 
 33.13 
(1.565) 
22.73 
(1.401) 
19.26 
(1.248) 
18.08 
(1.338) 
18.47 
(1.249) 
First Period 11.25  
(3.039) 
 21.74 
(3.347) 
11.17 
(2.856) 
7.19 
(2.443) 
8.05 
(2.731) 
7.59 
(2.542) 
Last Period 32.27 
(3.691) 
 43.10 
(3.502) 
31.70 
(3.373) 
29.38 
(3.078) 
27.17 
(3.183) 
30.51 
(3.261) 
Panel C. strong ratcheting (strongR) 
All Periods 20.30 
(1.656) 
 34.96 
(1.557) 
24.03 
(1.453) 
15.93 
(1.220) 
16.20 
(1.241) 
10.36 
(1.143) 
First Period 10.08 
(3.365) 
 22.77 
(3.383) 
13.58 
(3.098) 
5.46 
(2.427) 
7.04 
(2.565) 
1.54 
(2.340) 
Last Period 30.29 
(3.700) 
 46.58 
(3.575) 
33.82 
(3.346) 
27.18 
(3.029) 
25.52 
(3.026) 
18.32 
(2.661) 
Note: Overall cooperation rates as well as cooperation rates per phase in base (Panel A), weak ratcheting (Panel B), 
and strong ratcheting (Panel C). Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Result 1. At the beginning of each phase, cooperation rates in weakR and strongR are significantly 
lower than those in base. The difference in cooperation rates between weakR and strongR is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
Support for Result 1 is presented in Table 1, which summarizes the average cooperation rates (see 
Table 1 - column 1) as well as the cooperation rates separately for each phase (see Table 1 - column 
2 - 6). In strongR, right at the beginning of each of the five phases, cooperation rates are on average 
significantly below those in base (10.08 vs. 49.42 percent, p-value < 0.000, Wilcoxon rank sum 
test). The same holds true for the cooperation rates in weakR. Contribution rates in period 1 are on 
average significantly lower in weakR compared to base (11.25 vs. 49.42 percent, p-value < 0.000, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test). There are no significant differences between our two ratcheting 
treatments right at the beginning of the phases (10.08 vs. 11.25 percent, p-value = 0.3588, 
Wilcoxon rank sum test). Result 1 shows that contribution levels differ significantly across 
treatments right at the beginning of each phase. Our next result reveals that contribution levels also 
show clearly different trends across treatments. 
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Table 2: Ratchet effects – Group level analysis 
Dependent variable: Cooperation rate 
 (1) (2) (3) 
weakR -17.474*** -17.474*** -38.169*** 
 (5.352) (2.567) (5.496) 
strongR -19.513*** -19.513*** -39.337*** 
 (5.302) (2.543) (5.444) 
period 2  2.140 -5.316 
  (3.320) (5.349) 
period 3  4.366 -7.896 
  (3.320) (5.349) 
period 4  4.940 -14.067*** 
  (3.320) (5.349) 
period 5  6.042* -20.753*** 
  (3.320) (5.349) 
weakR x period 2   12.056 
   (7.772) 
strongR x period 2   11.006 
   (7.699) 
weakR x period 3   19.641** 
   (7.772) 
strongR x period 3   18.284** 
   (7.699) 
weakR x period 4   29.899*** 
   (7.772) 
strongR x period 4   28.869*** 
   (7.699) 
weakR x period 5   41.879*** 
   (7.772) 
strongR x period 5   40.960*** 
   (7.699) 
Constant 39.809*** 36.312*** 49.416*** 
 (3.684) (2.744) (3.782) 
Observations 85 425 425 
R2 0.167 0.154 0.239 
Adjusted R2 0.147 0.141 0.213 
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is the cooperation rate at the group 
level. The explanatory variables in column 1 are indicator variables for the treatments. Column 2 contains indicator 
variables for treatments and periods. Column 3 also contains the interaction of indicator variables for treatments with 
indicators for periods. weakR: indicator for weak ratcheting treatment, strongR: indicator for strong ratcheting 
treatment, period 1 - 5: indicator for period 1 to 5. * 𝑝<0.10, ** 𝑝<0.05, and *** 𝑝<0.01. 
 
Result 2. In base, cooperation rates show a significant downward trend over time. Cooperation 
rates in weakR and strongR, in contrast, increase significantly over time.  
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Figure 2 and Table 1 show the trends in cooperation rates across treatments. In base, average 
cooperation rates decrease by around 21 percentage points from 49.42 percent in period 1 to 28.66 
percent in period 5. Cooperation rates in the two ratcheting treatments show a different trend. In 
weakR, cooperation rates increase steadily by 21 percentage points from 11.25 percent in period 1 
to 32.27 percent in period 5. Furthermore, cooperation rates in strongR increase by 20 percentage 
points from 10.08 percent in period 1 to 30.29 percent in period 5.  
Result 2 is supported by a series of linear regression models. Table 2 reports the results of OLS 
models of the groups’ cooperation rates. The first model in Table 2 includes indicator variables for 
the two ratcheting treatments but does not allow for different effects by periods. The second model 
controls for general trends and the third model accounts for different trends across treatments by 
including interactions between periods and treatments. To ease interpretation, Figure 3 shows the 
estimated interaction effects, i.e. the deviation from first period contribution levels by treatment of 
all phases. While cooperation rates in base significantly decrease over time, those in weakR and 
strongR show a significantly positive trend. While the increasing trend in strongR is externally 
enforced, the increase in weakR is clearly above the theoretical prediction. Consequently, we have 
to reject our hypothesis H2, which stated that participants’ cooperation rates in base and weakR are 
identical to the Nash equilibrium over the course of the experiment. Furthermore, the average level 
of contributions in strongR is clearly above the theoretical prediction. Thus, we also have to reject 
our hypothesis H3, which stated that contribution patterns in strongR are centered around the Nash 
equilibrium.  
All in all, trends in cooperation rates in both ratcheting treatments run in the opposite direction than 
our baseline treatment. They are, however, not strong enough to outweigh the initial differences. 
This leads to our third result. 
 
Result 3. On average, cooperation rates in weakR and strongR are significantly below the 
cooperation rates in base. The difference in cooperation rates between weakR and strongR is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
 
The average cooperation rates in weakR (22.34 vs. 39.81 percent, p-value = 0.0032, Wilcoxon rank 
sum test) and strongR (20.30 vs. 39.81 percent, p-value = 0.0012, Wilcoxon rank sum test) 
treatments are significantly lower than in base (see also Table 2, Model 1). Furthermore, we do not  
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Figure 3: Trends in cooperation rates per group by period and treatment 
 
Note: Trends by treatment are given by the difference in cooperation rates (in percentage points) in period 2 – 5 
compared to cooperation rates in period 1. Trends are calculated separately by treatment and periods. Confidence 
intervals are calculated at the 95 percent level. 
 
find significant differences between the cooperation rates in weakR and strongR (22.34 vs. 20.30 
percent, p-value = 0.5642, Wilcoxon rank sum test). Cumulated public good contribution levels in 
weakR and strongR are, therefore, significantly below those in our baseline treatment. In base, 
participants’ public good contributions cumulate to on average 897 per phase. In weakR and 
strongR, in contrast, contributions per phase cumulate to 635 and 604, respectively. Cumulated 
provision levels in weakR (p-value < 0.000) and strongR (p-value < 0.000) are significantly below 
those in base and, consequently, we have to reject our hypotheses H1, which stated that cumulated 
public good contributions are equal across all treatments. 
Given the different trends in contribution levels, our results at the group level show that the 
comparable low cooperation rates at the beginning of each phase are decisive for the low cumulated 
public good contribution levels in both ratcheting treatments. Furthermore, cooperation rates under 
ratcheting decrease from phase to phase (see Figure 2).  
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3.2 Individual level analysis 
Our analysis at the group level in Section 3.1 shows that cooperation rates in both ratcheting 
treatments (weakR and strongR) are significantly lower at the beginning of the game than in the 
baseline treatment. Although cooperation rates in weakR and strongR increase steadily over time, 
this positive trend is not strong enough to catch up the backlog to base. On average, cooperation 
rates in weakR and strongR are significantly below those in base. The group level analysis, 
however, leaves open what drives participants in weakR and strongR to cooperate so little at the 
beginning of the game. In this section, we investigate participants’ cooperation behavior at the 
individual level in order to analyze why participants in both ratcheting treatments are especially 
cautious with their public good contributions at the beginning of the game.  
Participants’ willingness to take social risks plays a central role in their willingness to cooperate. 
There is always an element of fear of exploitation (De Cremer 1999) that causes participants to be 
cautious, leading to non-cooperative behavior (e.g. Yamagishi and Sato 1986, Parks and Hulbert 
1995). In the realm of the private provision of public goods, the fear of exploitation can have both 
monetary as well as non-monetary components. The monetary component comprises participants’ 
concern that they will receive no payoff from their engagement. A motive for non-cooperative 
behavior could be the attempt to minimize the pure monetary risk of being exploited by not 
contributing to the public good, since a player’s own payoffs are lowest if she cooperates while 
others do not (e.g. Dawes et al. 1986). Beyond this purely outcome-based motive, the fear of 
exploitation could also incur a psychological element as well as non-monetary costs. This includes 
disutility from the experience of betrayal defined as non-reciprocated trust (e.g. Aimone et al. 2015, 
Bohnet et al. 2008). 
The fear of being exploited by free-riders could explain non-cooperative behavior in virtually all 
public goods games (e.g. Cubitt et al. 2017). However, ratcheting increases the social risk of being 
exploited at the beginning of the game, which could help to explain why participants in weakR and 
strongR are especially cautious and contribute initially less than in our baseline treatment. With 
ratcheting, positive contributions determine a path dependency, meaning participants cannot 
simply adjust their contributions downward in the next period. They are bound from below to what 
they have contributed in weakR and strongR. They cannot directly mirror uncooperative behavior 
of other group members in the corresponding phase of the experiment; the risk of being exploited 
is especially high with ratcheting. Consequently, participants’ fear of the risk of being exploited  
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Table 3: Exploitation effect – Individual level analysis 
Dependent variable: Cumulated cooperation rates per phase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
gap -0.268***  -0.239***  -0.119***  
 (0.028)  (0.029)  (0.046)  
exploitation  -6.365***  -5.405***  -0.673 
  (1.400)  (1.391)  (2.109) 
weakR   -4.637*** -6.471*** -8.158*** -3.188 
   (1.510) (1.518) (1.872) (2.071) 
strongR   -7.238*** -9.086*** -10.314*** -5.006** 
   (1.501) (1.508) (1.856) (2.065) 
gap x weakR     -0.176***  
     (0.056)  
exploitation x weakR      -6.642** 
      (2.944) 
gap x strongR     -0.154***  
     (0.055)  
exploitation x strongR      -8.339*** 
      (2.916) 
sum con Phase prev 0.812*** 0.721*** 0.773*** 0.683*** 0.773*** 0.686*** 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.022) 
Constant -4.100*** 6.941*** 1.481 12.660*** 3.881** 10.163*** 
 (1.279) (0.895) (1.765) (1.308) (1.899) (1.549) 
Observations 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 1,360 
R2 0.515 0.490 0.523 0.504 0.527 0.507 
Adjusted R2 0.514 0.489 0.521 0.503 0.525 0.505 
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is cumulated cooperation rate per phase 
at the individual level. gap captures the difference between participants’ cumulated cooperation rates and the average 
cumulated cooperation rates by their group members in the previous phase. exploitation indicates that participants 
contributed more (1) or less (0) than their group members in the previous phase. sum con Phase prev captures 
participants’ cumulated cooperation rates in the previous phase. Furthermore, we include indicator variables for the 
different ratcheting treatments as well as their interactions with gap and exploitation. * 𝑝<0.10, ** 𝑝<0.05, and *** 
𝑝<0.01. 
 
could help to explain why participants are especially reluctant at the beginning of the each phase 
in weakR and strongR as compared to base. 
In order to investigate whether participants’ fear of the risk of being exploited drives our results, 
we analyze participants’ public good contributions at the individual level. The results in Section 
3.1 suggest that a non-negligible amount of participants anticipate right at the beginning of the 
game that cooperative behavior can easily be exploited, and that this has especially severe 
consequences under ratcheting. They are especially cautious and restrict their cooperation levels 
already at the beginning of the first phase. In addition, our experimental design allows us to test  
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Table 4: Exploitation effect by phase and treatment 
 Overall  Per phase 
  Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V 
Panel A. baseline (base) 
 -0.67 
(0.021)  
 -2.85 
(4.634) 
-0.98 
(4.165) 
-0.20 
(3.980) 
-0.46 
(4.052) 
Panel B. weak ratcheting (weakR) 
 -7.32*** 
(2.256) 
 -15.90*** 
(5.173) 
-9.28** 
(4.343) 
-6.65 
(4.216) 
0.38 
(4.270) 
Panel C. strong ratcheting (strongR) 
 -9.01*** 
(2.230) 
 -14.00*** 
(5.170) 
-12.03*** 
(4.343) 
-4.80 
(4.418) 
-6.50 
(4.207) 
Note: Overall exploitation effects as well as exploitation effects per phase in base (Panel A), weak ratcheting (Panel 
B), and strong ratcheting (Panel C). Standard errors in parentheses. Estimates for the overall exploitation effect are 
based on the regression in Table 3 – model (6). Corresponding estimates for the exploitation effect per phase are based 
on the regressions in Table A3.1 (model (1) – (4)) in the appendix 3. * 𝑝<0.10, ** 𝑝<0.05, and *** 𝑝<0.01. 
 
how participants who have been exploited in one phase of the experiment adjust their public good 
contribution levels in the next phase of the game. Based on a series of linear regression models (see 
Table 3), we summarize the main findings in Table 4 and illustrate them in Figure 4. In the analysis 
we use participants’ cumulated cooperation rates in one phase of the experiment as a dependent 
variable. Participants’ cumulated cooperation rates in the previous phase (sum con Phase prev)and 
the difference between participants’ cumulated cooperation rates and the average of the cumulated 
cooperation rates by other group members in previous phase (gap) are our explanatory variables of 
major interest. Furthermore, the indicator variable exploitation indicates that a participant has been 
exploited, and cooperated more than the other group members in the previous phase. 
We find that participants who have been exploited contribute less in the subsequent phase of the 
experiment. Across all treatments, participants who contribute more to the public good than their 
group members in one phase of the experiment contribute significantly less to the public good than 
those who have not have been exploited (p-value < 0.001, Table 2 – Column 1). On average, their 
cooperation rates decrease by 6.37 percentage points. Most importantly, this effect is especially 
strong with ratcheting. Based on the model in Table 3 – Column 6, we separately estimate the 
exploitation effect by treatments. Results are summarized in Table 4 and illustrated in Figure 4. 
Separating this effect by treatments shows that the effect of exploitation is especially strong in the 
weak and strong ratcheting treatment. In base, the effect is slightly negative but does not reach 
significance at conventional statistical levels (-0.67 percentage points, p-value = 0.7498, Table 4 – 
Column 1). In weakR, exploited participants contribute in the subsequent phase significantly less 
than non-exploited participants. With 7.32 percentage points, this effect is quite substantial and  
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Figure 4: Exploitation effect by treatment 
 
Note: Exploitation effect given by the difference (in percentage points) in cumulated cooperation rates per phase 
between participants who cooperated more or less than their group members in the previous phase. The exploitation 
effect is estimated across all phases, and separately for the different treatments. Confidence intervals are calculated at 
the 95 percent level. 
 
statistically significant (p-value = 0.002, Table 4 – Column 1). In strongR, the exploitation effect 
is even bigger and amounts to 9.01 percentage points (p-value < 0.000, Table 4 – Column 1). 
By examining the exploitation effect on a phase-to-phase basis (see Table 4 – columns 2-5), we 
find that this effect loses its strength over the course of the experiment. While it is especially strong 
at the beginning of the experiment, the exploitation effect does not reach statistical significance at 
the end of the experiment. Participants who have been exploited in phase I reduce their contribution 
in phase II by 15.90 percentage points (p-value = 0.0023) in weakR and 14.00 percentage points 
(p-value = 0.0071) in strongR. The effect of being exploited in phase II also significantly affects 
participants’ cooperation rates in phase III (weakR: -9.28 percentage points, p-value = 0.0371; 
strongR: -12.03 percentage points, p-value = 0.0059). From phase III onwards, the exploitation 
effect does not reach statistical significance at conventional levels, neither in the weak nor in the 
strong ratcheting treatment. 
Our individual level analysis suggests that ratcheting enhances participants’ fear of being exploited 
at the beginning of the game, thereby explaining the low cooperation rates. One could argue that 
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this effect is reversed once the first period has been completed. From period 2 onwards, cooperation 
rates are bounded from below and, consequently, the risk of being exploited is reduced. More 
precisely, the risk of being exploited does not increase over the course of the game if participants 
do not increase their own cooperation rates. This determines an upper bound for the level of 
exploitation, reduces the risk of being exploited in the subsequent period, and helps to explain the 
positive trend in cooperation rates in our weak ratcheting treatment. 
4 Conclusion  
In this paper, we investigate the effect of dynamic minimum contribution levels in a repeated social 
dilemma. We distinguish between strong ratcheting, where individual contributions to a cumulative 
public good have to increase over time, and weak ratcheting, which only prevents individual 
contributions from decreasing over time. Our core result is a statistically and economically 
significant ratchet effect. In both ratcheting treatments, participants strategically restrict their 
public good contribution levels at the beginning of the game. While cooperation rates under 
ratcheting increase over the course of the game, this increase is not sufficient to compensate the 
distinct drop of cooperation rates at the beginning of the game.  
Our work suggests that ratcheting loses its efficiency when contribution decisions cannot be 
constantly revised. Extending the experiments by Dorsey (1992) and Kurzban et al. (2001), who 
find that ratcheting fosters cooperation in public goods games in continuous time, we show that 
cumulated cooperation rates under ratcheting are almost halve as compared to the baseline in our 
discrete game where contributions cannot be revised any number of time. This finding is not merely 
of technical or application oriented interest because many institutional mechanisms to foster 
cooperation in social dilemmas rely on discrete political decisions, such as international 
environmental agreements, that involve dynamic incentive schemes and cannot be revised any 
number of time. 
The observed treatment effect is not consistent with standard theory which has – as it generally 
does in social dilemma games – only very limited explanatory power. We identify participants’ 
fear of the risk of being exploited as a potential explanation of our results. Ratcheting deprives 
participants of the opportunity to directly reciprocate non-cooperate behavior. Cooperative 
behavior can easily be exploited by free-riders without the opportunity to directly reduce individual 
contributions. In this line, subjects either anticipate that cooperative behavior at the beginning of 
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the game entails the elevated risk of being exploited by free-riders, or subjects who experienced 
such exploitation reduce their contributions in the subsequent phases of the experiment.  
Our results might have some interesting policy implications, particularly for recent climate policy 
under the Paris Agreement. The observed negative effect of ratcheting on efficiency clearly 
challenges the belief that ratcheting is able to increase the contributions to the global public good 
climate change mitigation.13 We have shown, at least, that there is neither theoretical nor empirical 
support for the effectiveness of ratcheting.  
While the internal validity of our experiment is high (due to the fact that we are able to identify a 
statistically robust cause-and-effect relationship), the external validity, in particular for global 
climate policy, is more difficult to gauge. Our design is highly stylized and captures only the main 
features of the game which is played by the countries’ representatives. There are several potentially 
relevant features where our design simplifies the game played outside the laboratory. For example, 
it is well documented that subjects behave differently when rules to increase public goods 
contributions are endogenously implemented instead of being exogenously imposed. Furthermore, 
the negotiation process for the real world climate policy is much richer than our experiment’s, 
where subjects simply announce simultaneously and anonymously their contributions, and this 
process might interact with ratcheting. Also, our assumption of identical players might be critical 
since heterogeneity is an important aspect of real world climate policy, and laboratory evidence 
(Kesternich et al. 2014, 2018) shows that the performance of MCLs depends on the type of 
heterogeneity. Furthermore, our design assumes perfect compliance to the rules of the game. In the 
field, i.e. in global climate policy, compliance is, however, not enforceable. Countries do have the 
choice to leave an agreement if the conditions seem to be too unfavorable for them. The U.S. retreat 
from the Paris Agreement is a prominent example.14 Our experimental results show that even under 
perfect compliance there is no empirical evidence that ratcheting is able to mitigate or even solve 
the social dilemma of reducing global warming. On the contrary, ratcheting leads to lower 
contributions to the cumulative public good. Our results thus complement the existing economic 
criticism of the Paris Agreement, which states in particular that the agreement is not addressing the 
free-rider problem (e.g. Cooper et al. 2017). Simply to formulate a collective goal and let parties 
                                                        
13 According to the UNFCCC, the “pledge-and-review” implemented in the Paris Agreement process will “enable an 
upward spiral of ambition over time” (Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform, 2014, p. 18). 
14 On June 1, 2017, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. would cease all participation in the Paris 
Agreement. In accordance with Article 28 of the Paris Agreement, the earliest possible effective withdrawal date by 
the U.S. cannot be before November 4, 2020, four years after the Agreement came into effect in the U.S. 
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decide about individual contributions, which are hopefully increasing over time, is very likely not 
sufficient. Assuming general compliance with the agreement, the effect could not only cause 
countries to restrict their national contributions at the beginning, it could also cause countries to 
delay the process of determining new and more ambitious national determined contributions (in 
order to avoid the risk of being exploited). Furthermore, since the announced individual 
commitments are in aggregate well below the necessary overall CO2 emissions reductions level for 
achieving the two-degree-goal (Rogelj et al. 2016), the hope that more ambitious emissions 
reduction targets can be realized by ratcheting, seems to be “wishful thinking” (Cooper et al. 2017, 
p. 3), given our results. What is needed is a reciprocal commitment of countries where countries 
price carbon in case other countries do the same (MacKay et al. 2015).  
The need for a reciprocal commitment leads us to the question of how the weak performance of 
ratcheting might be improved. A plausible supplement could be the implementation of a “reciprocal 
commitment device” into a game with ratcheting. We leave this issue for future research.  
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Appendix 1: Theoretical predictions 
Treatments base and weakR 
The payoff function for subject 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, … 𝑛, over all 𝑇 = 5 periods is equal to 
Π௜ = ∑ 𝜋௜,௧்ୀହ௧ୀଵ = 𝛼 ∑ (𝑤்ୀହ௧ୀଵ − 𝑔௜,௧) − 𝛽 ∑ ൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,௧൯
ଶ்ୀହ
௧ୀଵ + 𝛾 ∑ 𝐺௧்ୀହ௧ୀଵ − ∑ 𝑇𝑎𝑥்ୀହ௧ୀଵ   
where 𝐺௧ = ∑ 𝑔௜,௧௡௜ୀଵ  is the group contribution to the public good in period 𝑡. In the last period 5, 
subject 𝑖 maximizes the following payoff function 
𝜋௜,ହ = 𝛼൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ହ൯ − 𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ହ൯
ଶ
+ 𝛾𝐺ହ − 𝑇𝑎𝑥  
We determine the FOC for payoff maximization 
ఋగ೔,ఱ
ఋ௚೔,ఱ
= −𝛼 − 2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ହ൯(−1) + 𝛾 = 0 ⟺ 𝑔௜,ହ = 𝑤 +
ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
  
Since the decision situation in period 4 and all other periods 3 to 1 is exactly the same, we obtain 
as the individual Nash equilibrium contribution level 
𝑔௜,௧∗ = 𝑤 +
ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
  
In order to determine the individual contribution level in the social optimum we consider the group 
payoff function  
Π = ∑ Π௧்ୀହ௧ୀଵ = 𝛼 ∑ (𝑊்ୀହ௧ୀଵ − 𝐺௧) − 𝛽
ଵ
௡
∑ (𝑊 − 𝐺௧)ଶ்ୀହ௧ୀଵ + 𝛾𝑛 ∑ 𝐺௧்ୀହ௧ୀଵ − 𝑛 ∑ 𝑇𝑎𝑥்ୀହ௧ୀଵ   
where 𝑊 is the group’s endowment and 𝐺௧ is the group contribution to the public good. In the last 
period 5, for a payoff maximum we obtain the following FOC and individual contribution level in 
the social optimum. 
ఋஈఱ
ఋீఱ
= −𝛼 − 2𝛽 ଵ
௡
(𝑊 − 𝐺ହ)(−1) + 𝛾𝑛 = 0 ⟺ 𝑔௜,ହ° = 𝑤 +
௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
  
For this, we are using 𝑊 = 𝑛𝑤 and 𝐺ହ = 𝑛𝑔௜,ହ since subjects are identical.  
Treatment strongR 
We assume that subjects increase their contributions only by the minimum integer amount required 
(+1). This means that 𝑔௜,ଵ = 𝑔௜,ଶ − 1 = 𝑔௜,ଷ − 2 = 𝑔௜,ସ − 3 = 𝑔௜,ହ − 4. For the group (𝑛 = 4) 
contribution we obtain 𝐺ଵ = 𝐺ଶ − 4 = 𝐺ଷ − 8 = 𝐺ସ − 12 = 𝐺ହ − 16. 
We express the payoff function (see above) in contributions of period 1 only and determine the 
FOC for payoff maximization 
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ఋగ೔
ఋ௚೔,భ
= −5𝛼 − 2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ൯(−1) − 2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ − 1൯(−1) − 2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ − 2൯(−1) −
2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ − 3൯(−1) − 2𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ − 4൯(−1) + 5𝛾 = 0  
For the individual equilibrium contribution level in period 1 we obtain  
−5𝛼 + 10𝛽൫𝑤 − 𝑔௜,ଵ൯ − 20𝛽 + 5𝛾 = 0 ⟺ 𝑔௜,ଵ =
ିఈାଶఉ௪ିସఉାఊ
ଶఉ
  
⟺ 𝑔௜,ଵ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑤 + ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
− 2  
For the contribution level in periods 2-5 we obtain 
𝑔௜,ଶ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑤 + ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
− 1, 𝑔௜,ଷ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑤 + ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
,  
𝑔௜,ସ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑤 + ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
+ 1, 𝑔௜,ହ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ∗ = 𝑤 + ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
+ 2 
Analogously, we obtain the individual contribution level in the social optimum 
𝑔௜,ଵ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ° = 𝑤 + ௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
− 2, 𝑔௜,ଶ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ° = 𝑤 + ௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
− 1, 𝑔௜,ଷ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ° = 𝑤 + ௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
,  
𝑔௜,ସ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ° = 𝑤 + ௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
+ 1, 𝑔௜,ହ
௦௧௥௢௡௚ோ° = 𝑤 + ௡ఊିఈ
ଶఉ
+ 2 
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Appendix 2: Power calculations 
Figure A2.1: Power curves – weakR and strongR 
 
Note: Panel A (B) shows the power curves in weakR (strongR). For each treatment we simulate a variety of different 
treatment effects ranging from 50 percent to 150 percent of the prior.  
We drive our priors for the effect sizes of the ratcheting treatments from a series of three pilot 
sessions conducted before the actual experimental sessions. 52 subjects participated in our pilot 
and we calculated average treatment effects to gain first priors. Based on these priors, we simulated 
a variety of treatment effects ranging from 50 percent to 150 percent of our initial estimates. The 
calculations are based on two-sided t-tests of means per treatment with independent samples 
conducted in R15 using the “pwr”16 package and illustrated for weakR and strongR separately in 
Panel A and B of Figure A2.1. As shown in Figure A2.1, we substantially oversample participants. 
With a minimum of 27 observations per treatment cell, we are able to detect a treatment effect 
comparable to our prior in weakR at a very high level of statistical power of more than 99 percent 
(see Figure A2.1 – Panel A). At conventional levels of statistical significance (5 percent) and power 
                                                        
15 R Core Team (2018), R: A language and environment for statistical computing. R Foundation for Statistical 
Computing, Vienna, Austria. https://www.R-project.org/ 
16 Champely, S. (2018): pwr: Basic Functions for Power Analysis. R package version 1.2-2. https://CRAN.R-
project.org/package=pwr 
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(80 percent), 12 observations per treatment cell would have been sufficient to detect a treatment 
effect similar to the effect observed in our pilot sessions. Similarly, in strongR we have a minimum 
of 28 observations per treatment cell where around 12 observations would have been enough to 
detect a treatment effect similar to the effect observed in our pilot at conventional levels of 
statistical significance (5 percent) and power (80 percent) (see Figure A2.1 – Panel B). Based on 
the pilot, we oversample participants also in strongR and are able to detect an effect comparable to 
the effect in our pilot sessions at a very high level of statistical power of more than 99 percent.  
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Appendix 3: Tables 
Table A3.1: Exploitation effect per Phase – Individual level analysis 
Dependent variable: Cumulated cooperation rates per Phase 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Phase II Phase III Phase IV Phase V 
exploitation -2.849 -0.983 -0.196 -0.461 
 (4.634) (4.165) (3.980) (4.052) 
weakR -5.447 -1.572 0.819 -4.979 
 (4.607) (3.974) (3.984) (3.945) 
strongR -6.093 -4.111 0.524 -8.716** 
 (4.614) (4.008) (3.879) (3.972) 
exploitation x weakR -13.050** -8.294 -6.455 0.840 
 (6.470) (5.717) (5.580) (5.690) 
exploitation x strongR -11.150* -11.051* -4.606 -6.044 
 (6.430) (5.642) (5.560) (5.625) 
sum con Phase prev 0.719*** 0.664*** 0.812*** 0.628*** 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) 
Constant 11.877*** 9.785*** 4.758 11.929*** 
 (3.575) (2.999) (2.957) (2.903) 
Observations 340 340 340 340 
Adjusted R2 0.457 0.500 0.568 0.495 
Note: OLS regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable is cumulated cooperation rate in Phase 
II (model 1), Phase III (model 2), Phase IV (model 3), and Phase V (model 4) at the individual level. exploitation 
indicates that participants contributed more (1) or less (0) than their group members in the previous phase. sum con 
Phase prev captures participants’ cumulated cooperation rates in the previous Phase. Furthermore, we include indicator 
variables for the different ratcheting treatments as well as their interactions with gap and exploitation. * 𝑝<0.10, ** 
𝑝<0.05, and *** 𝑝<0.01. 
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Appendix 4: Instructions 
 
Instructions (weakR) 
 
Welcome to Magdeburg Experimental Laboratory MAXLAB! 
 
Please read the instructions carefully and indicate by opening your door or raising your hand if 
you have any questions. 
In the experiment in which you are participating now you can earn money depending on your 
decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. Your payoff from the experiment is calculated 
in LaborDollar (LD) at an exchange rate of 1:125 between € and LD, i.e., 125 LD equal 1 €.  
You make your decision in the experiment anonymously. Only the experimenter learns your 
identity; your information is treated confidentially. 
 
Experiment rules 
In total, four players participate in the experiment, i.e., apart from you, there are three more 
players. The three participants you interact with remain the same in the entire experiment. 
The experiment comprises five phases. In each of the five phases, you play the same game. 
Every play consists of five rounds. Thus, in total, you play 5 x 5 = 25 rounds. At the start of each 
round, you and your three fellow players each receive an initial endowment of 100 LD. Thus, in 
the course of five rounds, i.e., per phase, you receive 500 LD in total. 
Your task, and the task of your fellow players, consists in deciding how many LD you want to 
contribute to a joint project. Your contribution can vary between 0 and 100 LD (only integers) in 
round 1. In all other rounds, your contribution needs to be at least as high as in the previous 
round. The maximum contribution is 100 LD.  
Your payoff for every round is determined as follows: 
 
= 4.4(100 − 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − 0.02(100 − 𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)ଶ 
+(𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑠) − 100 
 
That is, for example, if all the other three players contribute on average 30 LD to the project in 
each round and you contribute 90 LD, your payoff will be: 
 
= 4.4(100 − 90) − 0.02(100 − 90)ଶ + (90 + 3 ∗ 30) − 100 = 44 − 2 + 180 − 100 = 122 
 
If, on the other hand, all other players contribute on average 30 LD and you contribute nothing at 
all, your payoff will be: 
 
= 4.4(100 − 0) − 0.02(100 − 0)ଶ + (3 ∗ 30) − 100 = 440 − 200 + 90 − 100 = 230 
 
On your table, you can find a “payoff table”, which helps you calculate your payoff. In this 
payoff table, you can select the average contribution of all the other players (column) and your 
own contribution (line) (both in intervals of 5) for every round. In the respective cell of the table, 
you can then find you payoff per round in LD. 
At the end of the experiment, you receive the payoff from one of these five phases in € (in 
accordance with the exchange rate stated above). The phase for payoff is randomly chosen. 
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Therefore, you should act in each round as if it were relevant for payoff. At first, two practice 
rounds take place, which are not relevant for payoff. 
 
Control questions (weakR) 
 
If you have read the instructions and do not have any questions, please answer the following 
control questions (Tip: use the payoff table). 
1. Assuming your contribution to the project amounts to 20 LD while the average contribution of 
all other players is 50 LD: what is your payoff (in LD) in that round? 
My payoff is: _______ 
2. Assuming your contribution to the project amounts to 60 LD while the average contribution of 
all other players is 20 LD: what is your payoff (in LD) in that round? 
My payoff is: _______  
3. Assuming that the average contribution of all other players is 15 LD: with which of the 
following contributions can you achieve the highest payoff in that round (please tick)? 
O 5 LD  O 10 LD  O 15 LD  O 20 LD 
4. Assuming that you want to maximize your payoff: does it make sense to make no contribution 
(i.e. zero) to the project? 
O yes  O no 
5. Assuming that all players choose to make the same contribution: which of the following 
contributions leads to the highest total payoff to all players in a round (please tick)? 
O 0 LD O 50 LD O 70 LD O 90 LD O 100 LD 
6. Which rule applies to your payoff? 
O One of the 5 x 5 = 25 rounds is randomly chosen for payoff. 
O One of the five phases, which consists of five rounds, is randomly chosen for payoff. 
O All 5 x 5 = 25 rounds are paid off. 
7. Assuming that you have contributed 20 LD to the joint project in round 1 of a phase: how much 
do you need to contribute at least to the joint project in round 2? 
____ LD 
8. Assuming that you have contributed 20 LD to the joint project in round 1 of a phase: how much 
do you need to contribute at least to the joint project in round 5, i.e., in the last round of the 
phase? 
____ LD 
 
Once you have answered all questions, please give us a sign. We will then check your answers. 
The experiment starts after all subjects have passed the test.  
 
Good luck in the experiment! The MaXLab team 
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Appendix 5: Screenshots  
Figure A5.1: Input screen for treatment weakR 
 
 
Figure A5.2: Output screen for treatment weakR 
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